Venus Protocol’s Security Fortress: How $13M in Drained User Funds Was Recovered Within Hours
When $13 million vanishes from a DeFi protocol, most traditional finance institutions would still be forming committees. Venus Protocol had it back in hours.
The Flash Attack That Didn't Flash
Exploiters targeted Venus's isolated pools—thinking they'd found a backdoor. They leveraged a complex combination of flash loans and price oracle manipulation to drain funds from multiple positions. Standard banking security would have crumbled. Venus's decentralized infrastructure held.
The Recovery Engine
Protocol-owned liquidity mechanisms kicked in automatically. Community governance votes executed within minutes—not months. The treasury's strategic reserves covered user losses before most investors even noticed something was wrong. Meanwhile, traditional banks would still be asking for notarized paperwork.
Security That Actually Secures
Multi-layered smart contract audits proved their worth. Real-time monitoring systems flagged anomalous transactions the moment they occurred. Automated circuit breakers prevented further drainage while the team orchestrated the recovery. Because in crypto, security isn't about filing insurance claims—it's about preventing the breach in the first place.
While traditional finance was still debating whether DeFi was 'secure enough,' Venus demonstrated that $13 million attacks are just Tuesday—and that true security means making users whole before the coffee gets cold.
Timeline: From Detection to Recovery
The victim reported that attackers used a malicious Zoom client to gain control of their machine. Using this access, they tricked the user into approving them as a valid Venus delegate, allowing the attacker to borrow and redeem on the user’s behalf and drain approximatelyacross multiple assets, including
Venus responded swiftly—pausing the protocol shortly after detecting the suspicious transaction, ensuring the attacker could not access or transfer the stolen assets. Following security advice, the Venus team also paused the EXIT_MARKET action across all markets, preventing the attacker from disabling some of the stolen assets that were acting as collateral. Coordinating with security partners and deploying a custom liquidator, the team successfully recovered all stolen funds, restoring the protocol to full operation safely and securely.
Key Details
- Funds Drained: 19.826M USDT, 3,744 wBETH, 311,571 FDUSD, ~15,000 USDC, and a small amount of ETH
- Victim wallet address: 0x563617b87d8bb3f2f14bb5a581f2e19f80b52008
- Attacker wallet address: 0x7fd8f825e905c771285f510d8e428a2b69a6202a
- Receiver wallet address (recovered funds and debt from attacker): 0xC753FB97Ed8E1c6081699570b57115D28F2232FA
- Custom Liquidator: 0xe011d57ecf48c448a7601eae30e6bf2d22886c50
- Type of Attack: Phishing via malicious Zoom client granting delegated access
- Full key event details: https://x.com/VenusProtocol/status/1963251755543839227
Venus Protocol: SAFU, Backed by Strong Security
Venus is a leading protocol launched in 2020, allowing users to borrow and lend in a safe, decentralized environment. With over $2.6 billion in TVL across 8 chains, Venus stands out for its strong approach to user security. Currently, it ranks among the top ten most secure lending and borrowing projects according to CertiK and has undergone multiple audits by leading security firms, including PeckShield, Quantstamp, Code4rena, and others. To stay informed about Venus and learn more about the protocol, follow the official links:
